The
recent crisis between Moscow and Tbilisi in South Ossetia was a good
occasion for having some interesting conclusions. At a glance, it seems
that the powerfull comeback of Russia in the International political
scene creates a new framework, within which geo-political developments
in Eurasia will be analyzed from now on. Nevertheless, this isn't the
most important issue.
An even more significant accessory of the Ossetia crisis
is that it simply confirms Kosovo's aftermath. Because, in a few words,
the dispute between Russia and Georgia for domination in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia wasn't virginal generation - actually, it was born as a
result of Kosovo's independence, as another one affirmation of the
incontrollable consequences that prejudiced support of independence
movements can have. In an interesting Op-Ed article in Los Angeles
Times ("The Pandora's box of sovereignty", August 13, 2008) Thomas Meaney and Harris Mylonas successfully point out that Kosovo set a precedent for similar situations of ethnic conflict leading to independence appeals. They write:
"In
February, Bush and most European leaders backed the independence of
Kosovo from Serbia, which Putin vociferously opposed. Don't worry,
assured U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, saying, "Kosovo
cannot be seen as precedent for any other situation in the world
today." But precedent is exactly what it set. Just as the West wanted
to shield Kosovo from Serbian domination, so Putin hopes to free South
Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgian interference and keep them in the
Russian orbit of influence. Thus far, he has succeeded by rolling out
tanks while the West has paid only lip service to the territorial
integrity of Georgia."
Indeed,
like it happened after the dissolution of the former united Yugoslavia
in the start of '90s, the recent independence of Kosovo from Serbia
created new facts, which tend to invigorate independence minority
groups' argumentation around the world. On that specific point, the
U.S. Foreign Policy carries a big part of responsibility, exposing an
exasperating prejudice in its diplomatic attitude towards independence
movements. For example, Washington encourages the independence of
southern Sudanese but tries not to refer to Kurds'
continuous appeals in eastern Turkey. Isn't that a double-faced
practice? It is probably appropriate for diplomacy's realism, but on
the other hand, not only feeds the feeling of inequity (If Kosovo, then
why not us?), but also invigorates nationalism's audacity in places
where there is smouldering ethnic tension.
But, if Kosovo has the right to be independent from Serbia, then - why
not? - the same right could be applied to other cases as well: For
example, the Basques in Spain, northern Ireland or the
Albanian-speaking minority in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. Furthermore, when the U.S. government supports independence
appeals from the side of Kosovo or Tibet,
it seems quite weird to condemn Moscow for its intention to create a
similar status-quo in south Ossetia - when your own policy sets a
precedent, then you must be ready to accept the obvious consequences.
It is like the two sides of the same coin, as long as superpowers see
such conditions as an opportunity to afflict each other's interests.
Yes, it's all about power and domination, the very nature of
International Politics. However, what becomes quite clear is that when
governments' attitude towards national independence movements follows
the unfair doctrine "one law for the rich and another for the poor",
then, indeed, they open Pandora's box of national sovereignty and mine the foundations of Peace and Security themselves.
Born in Salonika, Greece in 1984,
Nikolaos L. Mottas is a research university student (PhD) and an
article-writer. He is a graduate of Political Science and holds a
Master of Arts on Diplomacy from the Diplomatic Academy of London. He
cooperates with the Greek newspaper 'Makedonia' as a freelance
international news Editor.
